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and more general assessments of political acceptability. Estimates of free-
ridership in the area of energy policy frequently rely on ex-post surveys that
ask program participants whether they would have behaved differently in the
absenceofprogramsupport.Thepresentpaperproposesanex-anteapproach
to the calculation of the free-rider share using revealed preference data on
home renovations from Germany’s residential sector. We employ a discrete-
choicemodeltosimulatetheeffectofgrantsonrenovationchoices,theoutput
fromwhichisusedtoassesstheextentoffree-ridershipunderacontemporary
subsidy program.Aside from its simplicity,a key advantage of the approach is
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Industrialized countries are increasingly grappling with the implications of heavy
reliance on fossil fuels, including environmental pollution and high import depen-
dency (Frondel and Schmidt 2008). In the European Union, the conﬂuence of
volatility in oil markets, political instability in energy-exporting regions, and a
surge in world-wide energy demand have stoked concerns of future energy supply
shortages. Against this backdrop, a key policy question concerns how to reduce
the consumption of fossil fuels, with improvements in energy eﬃciency frequently
cited as a promising solution for achieving cost-eﬀective savings (Balint et al.
2007; ECMT 2007).
Households are seen to aﬀord particularly high potential for energy savings,
as the residential sector in Europe typically accounts for upwards of 30% of
energy end use. In recent years, European governments have implemented several
ﬁnancial support programs to encourage home retroﬁts and the replacement of
ineﬃcient electric appliances. An important question in gauging the merits of
such programs is the extent to which they suﬀer from free-riding. Free ridership
occurs if the subsidized household would have undertaken the energy-conserving
activity even in the absence of the subsidy (Train 1994). As Wirl (1997, 2000)
argues, if the timing of the subsidy is foreseeable, some households who would
undertake a retroﬁt anyway would wait until the subsidy is released. Thus, not
only does the net beneﬁt of the program tend to be limited, but the program
might actually have adverse eﬀects on energy conservation.
Despite the potential of free-ridership to seriously undermine the economic
eﬃciency of a program intervention, the issue remains largely absent from con-
temporary environmental and energy policy discussions in Europe.1 One reason
1A recent document from an expert group on energy policy commissioned by the German gov-
ernment, for example, is completely devoid of references to free-riding, advocating the uncondi-
tional extension of e150 cash bonuses for purchases of new energy eﬃcient appliances (PEPP
2008). This disregard also characterizes the economic recovery plans that shall be launched
throughout Europe and the U.S.
4for this neglect is the inherent diﬃculty of assessing which households would
have undertaken the energy-conserving activity without the program support.
Modern evaluation research is of limited help in this regard, as even recently
developed non-experimental evaluation methods are typically predicated on the
use of appropriate comparison groups comprising program participants and non-
participants (Frondel and Schmidt 2005). Given this condition, it follows that the
program itself must have been implemented for its evaluation to proceed. The
estimation of the free-rider share thus becomes an ex-post exercise, undertaken
after the program funding has been allocated.
Building an econometric model of discrete choice, this paper suggests an
ex-ante procedure for assessing the extent to which free-ridership threatens to
undermine the social beneﬁts of energy conservation programs. Using a rich
household-level data set from a survey of 2128 owners of German single-family
homes, our key question is whether a given ﬁnancial incentive would alter the
retroﬁt decision of the homeowner or merely boost the household’s income. We
begin by estimating a discrete choice model to parameterize the eﬀects of energy
savings, costs, and household characteristics in determining the likelihood of one
of 16 candidate retroﬁt measures. To gauge the share of free-riders induced by
grants programs with a similar design as one that was recently introduced in
Germany, we subsequently use the model estimates to simulate retroﬁt choices
under alternative assumptions about the levels of program support in oﬀsetting
costs.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. After a brief survey of the
literature on free-riding in section 2, section 3 describes the data, discusses the
model speciﬁcation and catalogues the estimation results. Section 4 illustrates a
procedure for simulation from which the policy implications are derived. Section
5 concludes.
52 Previous Literature
The paper builds on a handful of earlier studies of household energy consump-
tion behavior. Joskow and Marron (1992) and Eto et al. (1995) conduct a
meta-analysis of free ridership by surveying evaluations of demand-side manage-
ment (DSM) programs conducted by U.S. utilities. With respect to residential
programs, the authors uncover a wide range of estimates, varying from zero to
up to 50% of free riders. However, most of the reviewed evaluations are based
on simple survey questions that ask the respondents whether they would have
hypothetically reached the same decision in absence of the DSM program. Due
to the nature of these questions, the calculated free rider share may therefore be
susceptible to a hypothetical- or response bias.2
Malm (1996) circumvents these diﬃculties by analyzing the revealed choice of
high-eﬃciency heating system purchases among diﬀerent clusters of consumers.
He derives a share of 89% of households that would have bought the eﬃcient
equipment even in the absence of a subsidy. Cameron (1985) was among the ﬁrst
to analyze retroﬁt choices using a nested logit model. She ﬁnds that these choices
are inelastic with respect to investment cost, and hence awarded grants will not
have a sizable eﬀect in enhancing residential energy eﬃciency.
More recently, Gr¨ osche and Vance (2009) develop an error components model
to investigate the problem of free-ridership. Abstracting from the possible exis-
tence of hidden costs, including transaction costs and emotional stress, they des-
ignate potential free-riders as those whose estimated willingness-to-pay (WTP) is
higher than the observed investment cost, and ﬁnd a free-rider share approaching
50%. Drawing on the same data set, the present paper takes a diﬀerent route for
identifying potential free riders. First, the model speciﬁcation employed is more
ﬂexible, allowing for diﬀerential eﬀects of household-level socioeconomic variables
2To the extent that program participants feel committed to justify the existence of the DSM
program the bias would yield an underestimation of the true free-rider share.




Cost ∆Q Households Cost ∆Q
No renovation 799
Roof 12.45 6.68 75 11.02 5.11
Window 6.59 2.86 87 7.03 3.64
Fa¸ cade 10.90 7.28 20 11.73 9.28
Heating 2.40 3.28 300 2.39 4.00
Roof, Window 19.04 9.53 84 17.54 13.70
Roof, Fa¸ cade 21.03 13.95 13 19.42 15.62
Roof, Heating 14.85 9.26 81 15.84 11.97
Window, Fa¸ cade 17.49 10.13 24 18.09 13.87
Window, Heating 8.99 5.86 202 9.32 7.59
Fa¸ cade, Heating 13.31 9.81 20 14.87 13.24
Roof, Window, Fa¸ cade 27.62 16.81 37 28.42 23.59
Roof, Window, Heating 21.44 11.83 168 21.80 17.78
Roof, Fa¸ cade, Heating 23.43 15.79 20 24.76 23.34
Window, Fa¸ cade, Heating 19.89 12.39 50 18.81 15.90
Roof, Window, Fa¸ cade, Heating 30.02 18.36 148 32.90 27.31
In total 2128 households from western Germany. Investment cost are measured in 1000e,
energy savings (∆Q) are measured in MWh.
across each retroﬁt option. Second, by contrasting simulated retroﬁt probabili-
ties under diﬀerent hypothetical support schemes to calculate free-ridership, the
analysis facilitates a nuanced investigation of how the share of free-riders changes
with increases in the program subsidy.
3 Empirical Framework
3.1 Data
The data are drawn from a sample of 2128 single-family home owners from west-
ern Germany, surveyed in 2005 as part of the German Residential Energy Con-
7sumption Survey.3 Four diﬀerent retroﬁt measures are surveyed: roof insula-
tion, fa¸ cade insulation, windows replacement, and heating-equipment replace-
ment. These measures and any possible combination, including the option not
to undertake a retroﬁt, form a choice set with K = 16 elements from which
the household chooses. Table 1 lists the 16 available options along with the
number of households that actually chose the option. In total, 63% of the house-
holds retroﬁtted their homes between 1995 and 2004. The table further gives
an overview of the average investment costs and energy savings corresponding to
each option.
Cost and energy savings were not surveyed but are technical estimates, which
are calculated based on the individual characteristics of the homeowner’s dwelling.
This information was derived for each candidate retroﬁt measure. Cost are ex-
pressed in e while energy savings are expressed in kilowatt-hours, and are com-
puted as the reduction of the building’s primary energy demand following a ren-
ovation.4 Comparing the averages for the complete sample and the averages
pertaining to the retroﬁt measures actually chosen shows that the subgroup of
retroﬁtting households consistently exhibit either lower investment cost, higher
energy savings, or both. This demonstrates that households take these aspects
into account when deciding on a retroﬁt measure.
3.2 Model Speciﬁcation
Similar to Gr¨ osche and Vance (2009), we choose the conditional logit model as
the empirical point of departure, and explore the implications of estimating a
more general form of the model by including error components. In the general
3Households located in the former German Democratic Republic are excluded in this paper as
there was an extensive wave of publicly supported refurbishment in the 1990s following the
country’s reuniﬁcation.
4The calculation comprises information of the respective living space, the building’s age and
the original insulation standard, and draws on regional information concerning material cost
and craftsman wages. Further details on the data assembly are provided in Gr¨ osche and
Vance (2009).
8case, the utility Uij of household i for alternative j is deﬁned as:
Uij = Vij +

h∈{1,2}
ψhµjh +  ij
= α α α
 
jz z zi + β1Cij + β2∆Qij +

h∈{1,2}
ψhµjh +  ij. (1)
Vij denotes deterministic utility, which is comprised of alternative-speciﬁc at-
tributes (costs and energy savings, C and ∆Q) as well as characteristics of the
household, contained in the vector z z zi. The elements of this vector include the
household’s income, its energy consumption, and its access to information on
renovation options, the latter of which is proxied by a measure of the number of
certiﬁed home auditors within a 20 kilometer radius.5 As each of these variables
is measured at the household level, the identiﬁcation of this eﬀects necessitates
interaction with an alternative-speciﬁc variable. For this purpose, we create for
each of the 16 retroﬁt candidates interactions with an indicator vector α α α 
j, includ-
ing an alternative-speciﬁc constant term.
The error structure of the model is comprised of three components. The ﬁrst
is the usual random-utility error term that augments the deterministic utility
associated with each alternative. The other two components pertain only to sub-
sets of the alternatives, but apply equally to all alternatives within the subset,
thereby imposing a particular correlation structure across the utility of diﬀerent
choice alternatives (Brownstone and Train 1999). Correspondingly, two dummy
variables, µjh,h∈{ 1,2}, capture unobserved variance speciﬁc to these two sets
of alternatives, respectively. The error components ψh ∼ N(0,σ2
ψh) are speci-
ﬁed as normally distributed random parameters with zero mean. In specifying
this correlation structure, the aim was to capture latent eﬀects whose inﬂuence
5To derive this measure we drew upon a list of certiﬁed home auditors and their addresses
published by the German government. We read the data as a map-layer into a Geographical
Information System and overlaid this with a layer of household locations. We then created a
circular buﬀer around each household having a radius of 20 kilometers and generated a count
of auditors within this buﬀer. As a ﬁnal step, we divided this count by the number of homes
(excluding apartment complexes) within the buﬀer. The variable thus created serves to capture
the relative availability of expert guidance on retroﬁts within the vicinity of the household.
9could otherwise violate the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives
implied by the standard conditional logit model. The presented speciﬁcation in-
corporates two overlapping error components. As in Cameron’s (1985) nested
logit analysis, one error component clusters all alternatives that consist of any
retroﬁt activity and thus distinguishes the binary decision concerning whether
to retroﬁt. The second error component groups 13 of the retroﬁt combinations
involving the roof and fa¸ cade, as these tend to produce annoying levels of dirt
and disarray.
Assuming the remaining error terms  ij in equation (1) to be identically and
independently distributed as Gumbel (or Type I extreme value), the choice prob-












If neither of the two latent eﬀects turn out to be relevant, meaning that σ2
ψ1 =
σ2
ψ2 = 0, then equation (1) collapses to the conditional logit choice probabilities.
3.3 Coeﬃcient Estimates and Model Fit
Table 2 presents the results of the conditional and the error components logit
model. For brevity, the estimated interaction terms are presented in the appendix
(table 4), though it is noted here that the sign, magnitude, and signiﬁcance of
most of the coeﬃcients are similar across the two models. This also applies to the
coeﬃcients on Cost and Energy Savings presented in table 2. While the estimates
from the error components model are uniformly higher, their relative magnitude
is roughly the same.
Regarding the question of model ﬁt, a comparison of the log-likelihoods sug-
gests that the partitioning of the choice set using error components improves
performance. The likelihood-ratio-chi-square statistic is 26.2 with two degrees of
freedom, implying a statistically signiﬁcant improvement in ﬁt. Moreover, the




ˆ β s.e. ˆ β s.e.
Cost (Cji) −0.109∗ 0.012 −0.155∗ 0.015
Energy Savings (∆Qji)0 .193∗ 0.010 0.277∗ 0.017
Standard deviation for error components
Renovation at all 0.007 1.156
Annoying renovation 2.053∗ 0.349
Log-Likelihood -4176.4 -4163.3
∗Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Detailed results for the alternative speciﬁc constants and the
interaction eﬀects with the households speciﬁc vector z z zi are presented in table 4 in the
appendix.
standard deviation on “annoying” alternatives is also signiﬁcant, indicating that
the utilities of the respective retroﬁt alternatives are correlated.
Irrespective of the speciﬁcation chosen, we clearly see that the cost of the
retroﬁt measure exerts a negative eﬀect on its attractiveness, while the associated
energy savings tend to increase the probability that the measure is chosen. The
appendix reveals that, if anything, the eﬀect of higher access to information is to
raise the likelihood of the most comprehensive retroﬁt action, while households
displaying a higher consumption of energy tend to stay away from this alternative.
Household incomes do not seem to be important correlates of the decision, though.
In the subsequent simulations, our results will illustrate the eﬀect of subsidized
cost on predicted probabilities.
4 Policy Implications
4.1 Simulation Setup
The most recent ﬁnancial support program of the German government to en-
courage retroﬁts allows households to not only apply for loans, but also provides
11grants for covering renovation expenses. Up to 10% of the investment cost are
awarded, reaching a maximum of e5000 per dwelling. The question emerges as
to what extent the grants induce renovation activities beyond those that would
have otherwise occurred in their absence.
To clarify this issue, we simulate the eﬀect of introducing a grant that eﬀec-
tively reduces the investment cost of the considered retroﬁt options. For example,
a speciﬁc household receives a grant of θCij and has to bear a cost of (1−θ)Cij on
its own. In order to gauge the associated eﬀect on its retroﬁt decision, we use the
ﬁtted model parameters to compute revised probabilities Pi(j|θ) for each element
j in the retroﬁt choice set. We start with a grant of θ = 0% and sequentially
increase the quota in steps of 5 percentage points up to θ = 50% of investment
cost.
In each scenario, the simulated number of sampled households Nj|θ that would





where I = 2128 denotes the number of sample households.
We calculate the program expenses that accrue in each scenario by multiplying
the household-speciﬁc grant θCij for a speciﬁc retroﬁt option with its revised
probabilities to choose this option. Summation among the whole choice set and







The energy savings Sav(θ) – measured as the reduction in annual primary energy
demand arising in each scenario – are calculated in a like manner, by multiplying








12Because equation (5) does not control for the autonomous energy savings that
occur even in the absence of grants, Sav(θ) represents gross energy savings in
the speciﬁc scenario. Comparing Nj|θ,Exps(θ) and Sav(θ) with the situation
of zero grants, we can approximate the extent to which a speciﬁc grant triggers
additional beneﬁt.
4.2 Simulation Results
As we empirically observe the revealed choices of the sampled households in the
scenario with zero grants, this scenario can serve as a benchmark for the predictive
power of the two logit models. In this regard, we ﬁnd that the conditional logit
model performs better than the error component model. Table 3 gives a detailed
summary of the simulation results for the conditional logit model. The simulated
shares of households 1/I ·Nj|θ exactly coincides with the actual observed shares,
depicted in the ﬁrst column of table 3. By contrast, the simulated shares from
the error component logit model deviate slightly from the observed shares.6 We
therefore rely on the simulations performed by the conditional logit model for
further analysis , and report the simulation results of the error component model
in table 5 in the appendix.
The upper panel of table 3 shows the simulated share 1/I · Nj|θ for each
retroﬁt option. It can be seen that the fraction of households declining a retroﬁt
decreases with the introduction of grants: With zero grants, about 38% of the
households abstain from renovation; this share decreases to 35% when a grant
of 10% of investment cost is awarded. A more generous grant of as much as
50% of the investment cost causes the share of refraining households to decline
to 26%. Turning to the retroﬁt decisions, we observe an apparent shift to more
expensive choices with increasing grants. In the absence of ﬁnancial support,
6For instance, the actual percentage of households foregoing any renovation is 38% instead of
43% that are computed by the error component logit model. As a consequence, the error com-
ponent logit model simulates autonomous energy savings that underestimate the autonomous
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14the exchange of the heating equipment is the modal retroﬁt choice. As ﬁnancial
support increases, this option becomes less popular, with the combination of all
four retroﬁts (roof, windows, fa¸ cade, and the exchange of the heating equipment)
emerging as the favored option. The respective share 1/I · Nj increases from 7%
to 15%.
The lower panel reﬂects the impacts of the individual choices on the gross
and net energy-savings, and on the program expenses. For instance, with zero
grants, about 799 households (37.6% of the sample) abstain from renovation,
while the remaining 1329 (=2128-799) households retroﬁt their homes in some
way, yielding autonomous energy savings of 15,704 MWh. Raising the grant to
10% of investment cost, 745 households (35.0%) still do not undertake mainte-
nance, while the remaining 1383 households choose one of the 15 retroﬁt options.
The gross energy-savings amount in this scenario to 16,395 MWh. Deducting the
autonomous savings yields net energy-savings of 692 MWh. Assuming that each
implemented retroﬁt is ﬁnancially supported, nearly one million euros are paid
as subsidy to the retroﬁtting households.
The implications of the grants program on expenses and energy savings are
summarized in ﬁgure 1. The solid line denotes Sav(θ), and the circle depicts
the gross energy-savings of a grant of 10%. The dotted horizontal line renders
the autonomous energy savings of 15,704 MWh. The net energy-savings in each
scenario is the space between the solid and the dotted horizontal line.
The dashed line in ﬁgure 1 depicts the program expenses Exps(θ) triggering
the program net savings. Contrary to the linear development of Sav(θ), the ex-
penses rise at an increasing, non-linear rate. The explanation for this ﬁnding is
rooted in the shift away from inexpensive but eﬀective refurbishments towards
more expensive retroﬁt options, together with the increasing popularity of reno-
vation in general.7
7As can bee seen in table 3, an exchange of the heating equipment alone becomes a less fre-
quent choice in favor of additionally renovating the complete building shell. However, table 1
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Grant  (in % of investment cost)
The disproportionate rise in program expenses relative to the energy savings
yield increasing expenses per net saved kWh. Using the ¯gures reported in the
last two rows in table 3, we can calculate the \average price" associated with each
kWh. For instance, a grant of 10% yields program expenses of e2.088 million,
while the net savings amount to 1,383 MWh. Hence, each kWh net savings is
worth e1.51. Upgrading the grant to 50% is associated with the average price
rising to e2.14 per kWh. This trend stresses that as more of the cost is covered
by the grant, more expensive retro¯t options are \purchased".
As ¯gure 1 indicates, the autonomous savings are a considerable part of the
gross savings, especially with small scaled grants. Consequently, the success of the
grants program su®ers if a fairly large amount of the program expenses is assigned
to households that would undertake a retro¯t irrespective of the grants. Given
reports that on average 3:28 MWh=e2,400 = 1:44 kWh energy savings arise for this option
per invested e. On the other hand, retro¯tting the complete building shell and the heating
equipment yields 18:36 MWh=e30,020 = 0:61 kWh energy savings per invested e.
16
Because equation (5) does not control for the autonomous energy savings that
occur even in the absence of grants, Sav(µ) represents gross energy savings in
the speci¯c scenario. Comparing Njjµ;Exps(µ) and Sav(µ) with the situation
of zero grants, we can approximate the extent to which a speci¯c grant triggers
additional bene¯t.
4.2 Simulation Results
As we empirically observe the revealed choices of the sampled households in the
scenario with zero grants, this scenario can serve as a benchmark for the predictive
power of the two logit models. In this regard, we ¯nd that the conditional logit
model performs better than the error component model. Table 3 gives a detailed
summary of the simulation results for the conditional logit model. The simulated
shares of households 1=I ¢Njjµ exactly coincides with the actual observed shares,
depicted in the ¯rst column of table 3. By contrast, the simulated shares from
the error component logit model deviate slightly from the observed shares.6 We
therefore rely on the simulations performed by the conditional logit model for
further analysis , and report the simulation results of the error component model
in table 5 in the appendix.
The upper panel of table 3 shows the simulated share 1=I ¢ Njjµ for each
retro¯t option. It can be seen that the fraction of households declining a retro¯t
decreases with the introduction of grants: With zero grants, about 38% of the
households abstain from renovation; this share decreases to 35% when a grant
of 10% of investment cost is awarded. A more generous grant of as much as
50% of the investment cost causes the share of refraining households to decline
to 26%. Turning to the retro¯t decisions, we observe an apparent shift to more
expensive choices with increasing grants. In the absence of ¯nancial support,
6For instance, the actual percentage of households foregoing any renovation is 38% instead of
43% that are computed by the error component logit model. As a consequence, the error com-
ponent logit model simulates autonomous energy savings that underestimate the autonomous
savings calculated from the actual observed shares.
13that the program authority cannot identify such households, there is an incentive
to free ride on the grant. While we cannot pinpoint the extent to which such
free-riding takes place, we can examine the case in which every retroﬁt measure
receives ﬁnancial support to glean insights into whether the subsidy program
generates additional energy savings. The dashed-dotted line in ﬁgure 1 provides
the extent to which the grants program may suﬀer from misspent funds. It
illustrates the amount of program expenses assigned to free-riders. With a grant
of 10%, it almost coincides with the dashed line of program expenses Exps(θ).
In this scenario, not less than 92% of the expenses may be awarded to free-riders.
Expanding the program causes this quota to drop, as the program gradually
induces net beneﬁts, but even when covering 50% of the investment cost, some
70% of the public disbursements do not induce net energy savings. A sizable
grant is thus not a sensible option to address the challenge of free-riding. To
the contrary, such an expansion would mean that the public pays a rising price
for privately conserved energy. In this regard, the simulation seriously calls into
question the eﬃcacy of the program in inducing energy savings that would have
already occurred in the program’s absence.
5 Conclusions
Free-riding is a problem of outstanding importance for programs that support
residential energy conservation. Quantiﬁcation of free-riding, however, is compli-
cated by the fact that the program authority cannot identify whether a certain
household would undertake an energy-conserving activity without program sup-
port. Typical evaluation approaches require that the subsidy program itself must
have been implemented for its evaluation to proceed, which can generally only
occur after the program funding has already been allocated. By contrast, this
paper suggests an ex-ante procedure for assessing the extent of free-riding prior
to the funding decision.
17For a recently implemented grants program in Germany, we investigate the
extent to which the program suﬀers from free-riding. Using a revealed-preference
data set of 2128 households from western Germany, we analyze the individual
and choice alternative attributes that determine the decision process. Starting
with the standard conditional logit model, we augment the model’s ﬂexibility by
imposing a correlation structure among the utility of the alternatives with the
error components logit model. Because of its superior predictive accuracy, the
estimates from the conditional logit model are subsequently used to simulate the
introduction of grants on the household’s retroﬁt decision.
With respect to the social beneﬁts triggered by the grants program, the re-
sults are disillusioning. Under the current program design, the grants lower the
investment costs by up to 10%. The simulation shows that the program induces
relatively small energy savings beyond the savings that would occur in absence
of the grants. However, the program essentially subsidizes each implemented
retroﬁt. This means that in the worst case under which every eligible household
behaves rationally and hence applies for the grant, a remarkable share of 92%
of the program expenses will be awarded to free-riders. This disclosure is in
line with Wirl’s (1997, 2000) analytical conclusion, which calls into question the
general eﬀectiveness of such programs.
Our ﬁndings are of special interest in Europe, given that the European Union’s
recent Directive on Energy End-Use Eﬃciency requires that member states in-
troduce political measures to decrease energy end-use by 9%. Our results raise
serious scepticism as to whether such political measures can meet the basic expec-
tation that public money is well spent. While energy policy should pay attention
to the current challenges of energy supply security and climate protection, the
results presented here suggest that policy-makers take heed of free-rider eﬀects in
designing public programs to promote energy eﬃciency in the residential sector.
18Data Appendix




ˆ β s.e. ˆ β s.e.
Cost (Cij) −0.109∗∗ 0.012 −0.155∗∗ 0.015
Energy Savings (∆Qji)0 .193∗∗ 0.010 0.277∗∗ 0.017
No renovation Constant 2.246∗∗ 0.377 3.140∗∗ 0.475
Income 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.009
Information Access −0.028∗∗ 0.008 −0.034∗∗ 0.011
Energy Consumption 0.017∗ 0.008 0.018 0.010
Roof Constant −0.094 0.509 0.179 0.568
Income 0.009 0.012 0.007 0.013
Information Access −0.003 0.010 −0.006 0.012
Energy Consumption 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.014
Window Constant −0.039 0.470 0.955 0.528
Income −0.009 0.012 −0.011 0.012
Information Access −0.025 0.014 −0.032∗ 0.015
Energy Consumption 0.036∗∗ 0.009 0.037∗∗ 0.010
Fa¸ cade Constant −1.803∗ 0.859 −1.523 1.120
Income 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.021
Information Access −0.046 0.035 −0.051 0.044
Energy Consumption 0.012 0.019 0.015 0.025
Heating Constant 0.588 0.397 1.412∗∗ 0.472
Income 0.005 0.009 0.002 0.010
Information Access −0.031∗∗ 0.010 −0.036∗∗ 0.012
Energy Consumption 0.029∗∗ 0.008 0.028∗∗ 0.009
Roof, Window Constant 0.614 0.471 0.965 0.495
Income −0.013 0.012 −0.014 0.012
Information Access −0.017 0.013 −0.022 0.016
Energy Consumption 0.011 0.011 0.018 0.011
Roof, Fa¸ cade Constant −1.668 1.023 −1.674 1.404
Income 0.011 0.024 0.011 0.029
Information Access −0.010 0.027 −0.011 0.055
Energy Consumption −0.034 0.028 −0.033 0.028
Roof, Heating Constant −1.003∗ 0.473 −0.737 0.472
Income 0.014 0.011 0.013 0.011
Information Access −0.015 0.013 −0.018 0.016
Energy Consumption 0.026∗∗ 0.009 0.030∗∗ 0.010




ˆ β s.e. ˆ β s.e.
Window, Fa¸ cade Constant −0.354 0.755 −0.023 0.782
Income −0.023 0.019 −0.027 0.026
Information Access −0.053 0.036 −0.059∗ 0.029
Energy Consumption 0.013 0.017 0.017 0.025
Window, Heating Constant 0.731∗ 0.362 1.532∗∗ 0.415
Income 0.001 0.008 −0.001 0.008
Information Access −0.017∗ 0.008 −0.022∗∗ 0.008
Energy Consumption 0.019∗ 0.008 0.020∗ 0.008
Fa¸ cade, Heating Constant −1.956∗∗ 0.408 −1.750∗∗ 0.426
Income 0.001 0.008 −0.001 0.008
Information Access −0.017∗ 0.008 −0.022∗∗ 0.008
Energy Consumption 0.019∗ 0.008 0.020 0.008
Roof, Window, Fa¸ cade Constant −1.883∗∗ 0.365 −1.836∗∗ 0.371
Income 0.001 0.008 −0.001 0.008
Information Access −0.017∗ 0.008 −0.022∗∗ 0.008
Energy Consumption 0.019∗ 0.008 0.020∗ 0.008
Roof, Window, Heating Constant 0.482 0.336 0.920∗∗ 0.352
Income 0.001 0.008 −0.001 0.008
Information Access −0.017∗ 0.008 −0.022∗∗ 0.008
Energy Consumption 0.019∗ 0.008 0.020∗ 0.008
Roof, Fa¸ cade, Heating Constant −2.663∗∗ 0.396 −2.674∗∗ 0.407
Income 0.001 0.008 −0.001 0.008
Information Access −0.017∗ 0.008 −0.022∗∗ 0.008
Energy Consumption 0.019∗ 0.008 0.020∗ 0.008
Window, Fa¸ cade, Heating Constant −0.889∗ 0.357 −0.622 0.379
Income 0.001 0.008 −0.001 0.008
Information Access −0.017∗ 0.008 −0.022∗∗ 0.008
Energy Consumption 0.019∗ 0.008 0.020∗ 0.008
Standard deviation for error components
Renovation at all 0.007 1.156
Annoying renovation 2.053∗∗ 0.349
Log-Likelihood -4176.4 -4163.3
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